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The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) has been billed from the start as the “Doha Development Agenda,” with the 
promise in the Doha Ministerial Declaration to “place [developing countries’] needs and 
interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this Declaration.”  The reason 
for this emphasis was in part the perception that previous rounds had neglected the 
interests of developing countries or, in the case of the Uruguay Round, had brought 
developing countries on board with promises that were misleading or not likely to be 
kept.  The collapse of the September 2003 Cancun Ministerial Meeting reinforced the 
need to address the interests of developing countries, and recent agreements reached at 
the WTO in Geneva suggest that the Doha negotiations may now be on track.  What is 
now important to emphasize, as the negotiations get under way, is to follow through with 
actions that are designed to fulfill the special needs of developing countries and to 
address their problems in implementing these actions. 
 
In our paper we lay out what we believe to be the most important actions that could be taken in 
the Doha Round for the benefit of developing countries, including India.  We base these 
suggestions primarily on the understanding of the economics of international trade that has been 
developed over the last two centuries and is widely taught in the universities of the world, and 
also on the research in recent years dealing with specific aspects of trade negotiations in general 
and of the Doha Round in particular.  With regard to the interests of developing countries 
generally, we provide recommendations for WTO decision-making, agricultural policies, market 
access, intellectual property, services, the Singapore issues, technical assistance, and special 
treatment. Each of these recommendations is accompanied by brief arguments in support.  The 
paper then goes on to review several more specific policy and negotiating recommendations 
focused on India. 
 
It is essential that India and other developing countries participate actively and constructively in 
the Doha negotiations to further their own interests.  They cannot rely on the best-intentioned 
developed countries to do this for them, since the developed countries will inevitably find 
themselves making compromises in favor of their own interests and in response to powerful 
pressures from their domestic constituents.  Many developing countries are at a disadvantage in 
the negotiating process, due to their resource limitations, and in many cases due also to their 
inexperience in negotiations.  Offsetting these disadvantages, however, are their large numbers 
and the compelling case that can be made for meeting their needs.  What the developing countries 
need is leadership and cooperation, which India is well suited to provide.  What is also needed is 
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The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) has 
been billed from the start as the “Doha Development Agenda,” with the promise in the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration to “place [developing countries’] needs and interests at the heart of the 
Work Programme adopted in this Declaration.”
1  The reason for this emphasis was in part the 
perception that previous rounds had neglected the interests of developing countries or, in the case 
of the Uruguay Round, had brought developing countries on board with promises that were 
misleading or not likely to be kept.  After the December 1999 Seattle Ministerial Meeting, in 
which negotiations foundered in part on the conflicting objectives of developed and developing 
countries, those who sought agreement in November 2001 to initiate a new round at Doha were 
determined not to repeat that experience.  The collapse of the September 2003 Cancun Ministerial 
Meeting has reinforced the need to address the interests of developing countries, and it is hoped 
that the Doha negotiations can be put back on track.  What is important to note in this connection 
if that there is attention in virtually every section of the Doha document to the special needs of 




In this paper we lay out what we believe to be the most important actions that could be taken in 
the Doha Round for the benefit of developing countries, including India.  We base these 
suggestions primarily on the understanding of the economics of international trade that has been 
developed over the last two centuries and is widely taught in the universities of the world, and 
also on the research in recent years dealing with specific aspects of trade negotiations in general 
and of the Doha Round in particular.   
 
We recognize that developing countries are a diverse group, and that any change in policy may be 
beneficial for some of them while it hurts others.  This is inevitable, and should be attended to by 
institutions that are capable of providing country-specific assistance.  The WTO must provide a 
structure within which countries can prosper, and that is what our recommendations are directed 
toward.  
 
Since our paper is intended to be a quick and accessible read for those involved in or attempting 
to influence the negotiations, we first present in Section II a series of individual recommendations 
under several headings, each buttressed by only the briefest of explanations and references to the 
literature.  Those who seek a more complete discussion can consult that literature.  Then, in 
Section III, we present some recommendations for India with regard to its negotiating positions in 
 
1 WTO (2001b, para. 2). 
2 To this end, the Ministerial Declaration includes the words “development” and “developing” a total of 63 
times in its ten pages and 52 paragraphs.   “Development” appears 39 times and “developing” 24.  For 
comparison, “WTO” appears 38 times and “trade” 65.  The Doha Declaration certainly pays lip service, at 
least, to economic development. the Doha Round as well as related domestic policy positions.  Conclusions are provided in 
Section IV.  
 
We recognize that India played a pivotal role in the November 2001 meeting in Doha and in the 
September 2003 meeting in Cancun on its own behalf and on behalf of other developing 
countries.  Much of what follows therefore is intended especially to clarify India’s interests in the 
Doha Development Agenda, which coincide in many respects with the interests of other 
developing countries, and to assist in the formulation of negotiating strategies for these various 
countries. 
 
We begin, below, with a point that is not really economic in nature, concerning the perceived 
legitimacy of negotiations and decision-making in the WTO.  We then turn to the major issues 
being addressed in the Doha Round negotiations and the positions that we believe that India and 
other developing countries should take, in their own interests, on those issues.  We also hope that, 
if the expressed intent of these negotiations to foster economic development is more than window 
dressing, negotiators for the industrialized countries too will favor these positions, even when 






WTO Decision Making 
 
Recommendation:  The WTO should establish a formal structure for its negotiations that will 
assure every developing-country member that its interests are represented in a manner that is 
commensurate with the importance of these members and their needs for the future of the world 
economy. 
 
Argument:  Although final decisions are made in the WTO by consensus, every member country 
ostensibly having a veto, in practice the important decisions come earlier, as texts are drafted and 
are to be adopted by the larger group.  In this process of drafting and then in negotiations on the 
content of these texts, many developing countries believe that they or their interests are being 
ignored.  The Director General (DG) of the WTO has often organized these discussions among a 
subset of WTO members in the so-called Green Room Group.  While the DG has attempted to 
represent developing-country interests in this group by including a selection of such countries, the 
process has been too ad hoc to inspire confidence in developing countries that they really have a 
voice.
4  More recently, in the run up to the Cancun meeting and thereafter, a new and equally ad 
hoc form of this process has been the “mini-ministerial meetings” that have been held in various 
locations among, again, a subset of WTO member countries.
5  It is true that more fruitful 
negotiations are possible within a smaller group than in the presence of the entire WTO 
membership, but priority should be given to organizing this process in a way that will be, and will 
be seen to be, fully representative of developing country interests. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Most of what follows has been adapted from Deardorff and Stern (2003). 
4 See Deardorff and Stern (2002). 
5 See, for example, Miller (2003) reporting on the third such meeting of 25 trade ministers, held in 
Montreal, July 28-30, 2003. Agricultural Policies 
 
Recommendation:  Developed countries must commit to reducing their production and export 
subsidies that stimulate production of those agricultural products that are of export interest to 
developing countries, as well as these and other policies including import tariffs and other 
barriers that reduce world prices of these products, and there must be a clear and explicit schedule 
for eliminating the effects of these policies completely and in a timely fashion.  
 
Argument:  Agricultural policies often have the effect, and sometimes the form, of subsidies to 
production and/or export.  In theory, while such policies reduce prices to world consumers, 
creating a benefit that is more than offset by the cost to the subsidizing country, the lower world 
price inflicts net cost on countries that also export the same product.  World prices are also 
reduced by high tariffs and by other import barriers on many agricultural products.  Developing 
countries often are affected adversely, and the cost is borne disproportionately by their rural and 
poor populations.  The world trading system in general, and its developing-country members in 
particular, need not object to government support given to farmers if it does not expand 
production and/or lower price; such non-distorting transfers within a country, if they can be 
achieved, are a matter for a country’s own taxpayers and government to decide.  On the other 
hand, it must be recognized that transfers that are not directly related to production or trade may 
nonetheless expand output if they permit a farmer to continue production who otherwise would 
not do so.  Negotiations on agricultural policies must therefore focus carefully on the full effects 
of all agricultural policies and assure that they do not distort international prices in a way that 
undermines the abilities, especially of developing countries to exploit their comparative 
advantage.
6  At the same time, to the extent that rationalization of these policies raises world 
prices of commodities that are important for low-income consumers, especially in net importing 





Recommendation 1:  Both developed and developing countries should commit to reducing their 
most restrictive trade barriers, including the elimination of all quotas and the substantial reduction 
of their highest import tariffs, and also the rationalization of tariff escalation and rules of origin
7 
that are biased against developing country exports. 
 
Argument:  For various reasons the highest trade barriers that exist today are predominantly on 
imports of the products most readily exported by developing countries, in particular apparel.  
Because these products tend to be labor intensive, such barriers undermine the ability of 
developing countries to pursue their comparative advantage as labor-abundant countries, thus 
adding to the already massive handicaps that these countries often bear.  At the same time, the 
                                                 
6 See Brown et al. (2003) for one among many studies of the effects of reducing agricultural subsidies and 
tariffs.  They also report effects for multilateral liberalization in manufactures and services, as well as 
several exercises in regional liberalization, many of which are relevant for other recommendations that we 
discuss below. 
7 Escalation is the common pattern of higher tariffs on processed goods than on semi-processed goods and 
inputs, a pattern that creates effective protection on final goods that is higher than nominal protection and 
that makes it particularly difficult for developing countries to expand into final-goods production.  Rules of 
origin are necessary in free trade areas (FTAs), in which the member countries retain different external 
tariffs, in order to determine whether a good qualifies for tariff-free treatment within the FTA.  These rules 
take many forms and often discriminate against developing countries. trade barriers in the developing countries themselves are often more restrictive than those in the 
developed countries and cover a much wider variety of products.  These barriers also interfere 
with the abilities of the developing countries to trade with each other.  And more importantly, 
they impose costs both on their own industrial users and on final consumers of these products.  
Like any meaningful liberalization, reducing these trade barriers will stimulate strong resistance 
in the countries that commit to do it.  But efforts should be focused on overcoming that 
resistance, and perhaps on providing compensation to those domestic interests who will be hurt 
by it, rather than on resisting the liberalization itself.  It is such resistance to liberalization that has 
led the world to its current regime of trade that, although it is liberal to an unprecedented degree, 
nonetheless remains restricted in those industries most important to the export success of 
developing countries. 
 
Recommendation 2:  The rules for administered protection – safeguards, countervailing duties, 
and anti-dumping – should be redrafted to focus their use on cases of legitimate economic 
justification, but to discourage their use as protectionist devices that limit market access. 
 
Argument:  It is widely acknowledged among economists that most if not all uses of anti-
dumping laws, and many uses of safeguard and countervailing duty laws, are not justified by 
inappropriate or harmful behavior on the part of foreign exporters.
8  Rather, these uses of 
administered protection have become the tools of choice for industries seeking protection for 
conventional (self-interest) reasons in a world where legislated protection is constrained by the 
GATT/WTO.  Unfortunately, even though the amount of trade covered by actual administered 
protection is small compared to trade covered by MFN tariffs and other barriers, the threat of 
action under these laws is pervasive and affects trade much more widely.  This threat, even where 
no actions are taken, discourages trade and fosters collusion among world suppliers, thereby 
reducing world welfare.  Like so many trade barriers, the costs of administered protection may be 
especially severe for developing countries that are often its targets.  These costs include not only 
the usual production and consumption costs of trade restrictions, but also the costs of 
participating in the legal proceedings involved.  Even more unfortunately, the trend today seems 
to be for developing countries to enact such laws of their own, thus not only further restricting 
their own trade, but also wasting their own resources on the administration of these laws.  Some 
means needs to be found to reverse this trend, perhaps by limiting the criteria in the WTO for 
action under these various forms of administered protection. 
 
Recommendation 3:  WTO rules governing the formation of Preferential Trading Relationships 
(PTRs) should be revised to insure that they contribute to the liberalization and simplification of 
the multilateral trading system. 
 
Argument:  Article XXIV of the GATT was drafted when PTRs were envisioned as a small 
number of largely isolated groups of countries, rather than the proliferation of overlapping free 
trade areas and customs unions that we see today.  Free trade areas especially, with their complex 
rules of origin and with their tendency to be formed between pairs of countries, contribute to a 
trading system that discourages the multilateral sourcing of supply chains that constitutes much of 
the promise of modern technology and globalization.  Furthermore, many PTRs today are 
negotiated in overlapping “hub and spoke” arrangements that limit trade among the spokes, and 
                                                 
8 Appropriate uses of these laws would include:  facilitating adjustment to injurious import surges 
(safeguards); offsetting the distortionary effects of those subsidies that are not themselves corrections for 
market distortions (countervailing duties); and prevention of dumping that is plausibly predatory – that is, 
dumping intended to secure a dominant market position and permit later price increases (anti-dumping).  
See Deardorff (1987, 1989). these spokes are most often occupied by developing countries, so that trade patterns among them 
are distorted.  What is needed is an amendment to Article XXIV that would govern the expansion 
of the membership in these arrangements, as well as the relationships among overlapping PTRs, 







Recommendation:  The Doha-Round negotiations should deliver on the promise at Doha to 
provide needed flexibility for developing countries to gain access to essential pharmaceutical 
products, and in the spirit of that Declaration, they should also provide similar flexibility for other 
products, such as those of biotechnology and information technology, that are needed to improve 
the health and facilitate the progress of developing countries. 
 
Argument:  Intellectual property (IP) protection is inherently the result of a tradeoff between 
incentives for innovation and creative endeavor, on the one hand, and both economic efficiency 
and distribution of income, on the other.  IP protection favors the former at the expense of the 
latter, and an enlightened policy would strike a balance between these opposing objectives.  As 
originally formulated, the WTO agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
failed to strike such a balance, requiring instead protection at a high level for all WTO member 
countries regardless of their needs and abilities to pay for the affected products.
10 In the 
pharmaceutical industry, the mistake became apparent as diseases have spread and could not be 
contained, leading to the special agreement in Doha.
11  But the principle applies much more 
generally than just to pharmaceuticals targeting the three diseases identified in that agreement.  
Now that the means of backing off from the extreme protection provided by TRIPS has been 
acknowledged, the same procedure needs to be provided much more broadly, not only to other 
products that can improve health in developing countries, but also to products that embody 





Recommendation:  Negotiations on trade in services should be pushed ahead, with attention 
given not only to the service industries of greatest interest to developed country exporters, but 
also to activities in which developing countries may have comparative advantage, such as 
outsourcing and the movement of natural persons. 
 
Argument:  The inclusion in the WTO of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
accomplished little or no actual liberalization during the Uruguay Round, but progress has been 
made since then in selected sectors of greatest export interest to developed countries.  One can 
                                                 
9 See Bhagwati et al. (1999) for several analyses of whether regionalism helps or hinders the progress 
toward multilateral liberalization.  After comparing multilateral and regional liberalization scenarios, we – 
in Brown et al. (2003, p. 827) – conclude that “realisation of the very significant benefits of multilateral 
liberalisation may be jeopardized by pursuing these [regional] arrangements.” 
10 That would not necessarily undermine the case for IP protection to promote innovation.  But combined 
with the small addition to incentives that obtains when poor markets are added to the protected rich ones, 
world welfare can be argued to fall with the extension of IP protection to all poor country markets.  See 
Deardorff (1990). 
11 See WTO (2002a). expect those countries to pursue these interests in other service sectors during the current round.  
That is beneficial for developing countries, even though their own service providers may suffer as 
a result, because the countries’ success in development depends heavily on access to the high 
quality, low cost services that competitive world-class firms can provide.  Developing countries 
stand to gain especially if certain service sectors, such as maritime shipping, can be made more 
competitive.  However, the danger is that GATS negotiations will confine themselves only to 
service sectors of export interest to developed countries, and that would be unfortunate.   
Developing countries need to pursue their own interests in these negotiations, and these interests 
arise most obviously in those labor-intensive services where they may have comparative 
advantage, such as outsourcing and the movement of natural persons.  Whether they will be 
allowed to pursue these interests depends on how the negotiations proceed.  If for example 
liberalization of movement is limited to highly skilled and highly trained persons, then 
developing countries may have little to gain.  But if it is extended to short-term movement of less 
skilled workers, then the GATS could become a vehicle for significant benefits to developing 
country populations.  This is unlikely to be accomplished, however, if the developing countries 
must negotiate for it alone.  What is needed is not only for developing countries to negotiate as a 
group, but also for the GATS negotiations to be joined by those industries within the developed 
world that stand to benefit from the services of workers who are either temporarily from, or 





Recommendation:  Negotiations on the Singapore Issues should proceed cautiously, taking due 
account of the difficulties many developing countries would have in conforming to whole new 
sets of procedural obligations, especially on investment and competition policies. 
 
Argument:  The Singapore Issues – trade and investment, competition policy, government 
procurement, and trade facilitation – all involve the potential for rules that would, in principle, be 
very beneficial to developing countries.  There are two dangers here, however.  One is that the 
impetus for these negotiations, particularly on investment and competition policies, comes mostly 
from the developed world, and especially from large corporate interests based there.  These forces 
may well push their own interests unduly, as in the TRIPS agreement during the Uruguay Round.  
Second, even if well-balanced agreements could be reached on each of these issues, 
implementation of each agreement would inevitably require creation of yet more bureaucratic and 
procedural infrastructure, something that many developing countries can ill afford.  Some 
progress on these issues would be desirable, but it should be slow and careful progress, with 
difficult adjustments postponed until developing countries have gone further in assimilating their 





Recommendation:  The WTO needs to agree on both formal mechanisms for providing the kinds 
of technical assistance to developing countries that were specified in the Doha Declaration, and 
on the means to finance that assistance. 
 
Argument:  The Doha Declaration mentions frequently the need to assist developing countries in 
their efforts to trade and to comply with their WTO obligations.  Many of the issue areas in the 
Declaration include acknowledgement that developing countries find compliance difficult, and that they require special assistance.  In addition, a separate item in the Declaration addresses 
Trade Facilitation, and another Technical Cooperation and Capacity Building, both of which are 
specifically directed toward helping developing countries to become better integrated into the 
world trading system.  However, it is not clear how this promise will be implemented in practice.  
The WTO itself is a small organization and ill equipped to provide the level of assistance 
required.  If the assistance is left to be provided by individual developed countries, it will 
confront the same provision-of-public-good problem that hinders development aid, in addition to 
difficulties of coordinating assistance so that it will not run at cross purposes.  The negotiators in 
the Doha Round need to create, and especially to provide funding for, the institutional facilities 





Recommendation:  The Doha Round should provide “special and differential treatment” of 
developing countries, and especially of the least developed countries, but this treatment should 
entail assistance with bearing the costs and fulfilling the obligations of the agreement, not 
exemption from the provisions for their own market liberalization. 
 
Argument:  The phrase “special and differential treatment” in the old GATT too often meant 
exempting developing countries from liberalizing their own trade.  The phrase appears again in 
the Doha Declaration, though without specifying what it will mean in this case.
12  It is to be 
hoped that, this time around, it will not mean continued protection, but rather acknowledgement 
of the adjustment costs of liberalization and a plan to provide assistance with bearing those costs.  
Such assistance is likely to include longer periods of time to comply with WTO rules, but it must 
also include financial and technical assistance, as discussed above. 
 
 
III.  Recommended Negotiating and Domestic Policy Positions for India 
 
Mattoo and Subramanian (2003) have reviewed the major challenges that India faces in designing 
and implementing their domestic and external policies in the context of India’s engagement in the 
Doha Development Agenda negotiations.  Their recommendations are as follows: 
 
Industrial tariffs—Reduce own bound and actual tariffs and seek to 
reduce tariffs in other countries, especially in textiles, clothing and 
footwear. 
Agriculture—End domestic policies that discriminate against agriculture.  
Push for liberalization on a global basis and consider joining the Cairns 
group. 
Services—Pursue further domestic liberalization, emphasizing 
competition more than a change of ownership, and greater use of GATS to 
precommit to future liberalization.  Create inter-modal negotiating 
linkages to enhance the scope for export of services through greater 
mobility of labor and capital. Strengthen domestic regulations and push 
for stronger multilateral disciplines on regulatory barriers to trade. 
                                                 
12 WTO (2002b, para. 44). Electronic commerce—The current WTO decision on duty-free treatment 
has little meaning since quotas and discriminatory internal taxation are 
still permitted in many cases. Therefore, widen and deepen the scope of 
cross-border supply commitments under GATS on market access 
(prohibiting quotas) and national treatment (prohibiting discriminatory 
taxation) to ensure that current openness continues in areas of export 
interest like software and database services. 
TRIPs—Change IP legislation to ensure that India can withdraw its TRIPs 
commitments in the event of TRIPs noncompliance by trading partners 
that affects India’s exports adversely. Institute workable systems for 
protecting traditional knowledge domestically in order to seek their 
replication internationally. Use India’s new competition policy and use 
judicious compulsory licensing to mitigate the egregious impacts of the 
TRIPs agreement. 
Preferential agreements—Argue for inclusion of compensation provision 
for third countries adversely affected by trade diversion. 
Competition policy—Strengthen implementation of India’s new 
competition law and be open to the development of meaningful 
multilateral disciplines, which ideally would also cover anti-dumping and 
international cartels. 
Standards—Strengthen disciplines on mutual recognition agreements 
(MRAs) to ensure that they are non-discriminatory.  Push for multilateral 
disciplines on domestic regulations in goods and services based on the 
necessity test.  Improve domestic standards.  And on labor standards, be 
proactive in the ILO while resisting attempts to bring the issue into the 
WTO. 
Government procurement—Be open to creation of multilateral 
disciplines, but link to the elimination of barriers to trade in goods and 
services, so that foreign procurement contracts can be contested in areas of 
comparative advantage, such as labor services. 
Investment—Be willing to discuss multilateral disciplines, but examine 
case for preserving discretion beyond that provided by strengthened 
competition policy.   
Anti-dumping—Curtail domestic use of anti-dumping. Argue for drastic 
reform of multilateral anti-dumping rules to eliminate current protectionist 




This paper has touched only on what we take to be the major issues affecting India and other 
developing countries in the Doha Round.  There are many other issues of importance to these 
countries, and the issues addressed here also involve many details that we have not been able to 
include.  It is essential that India and other developing countries participate actively and constructively in the Doha negotiations to further their own interests.  They cannot rely on the 
best-intentioned developed countries to do this for them, since the developed countries will 
inevitably find themselves making compromises in favor of their own interests and in response to 
powerful pressures from their domestic constituents.  Many developing countries are at a 
disadvantage in the negotiating process, due to their resource limitations, and in many cases due 
also to their inexperience in negotiations.  Offsetting these disadvantages, however, are their large 
numbers and the compelling case that can be made for meeting their needs.  What the developing 
countries need is leadership and cooperation, which India is well suited to provide.  What is also 
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